

# **Innovation on Prescription: A Critical Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Industry's Concerns Over**

## **Drug Regulation and Delays**

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### **Abstract**

The pharmaceutical industry's concerns about excessive regulation and slow approvals hindering innovation are overstated. This essay argues that regulation is not inherently antagonistic to progress but functions as a mechanism of optimisation, balancing the protection of public health with the need for scientific advancement. While industry concerns often reflect frustrations with rising costs and lengthy timelines, the obstacles lie in systematic inefficiencies and regulatory capture, which distort incentives as well as hinder competition. The analysis draws on theories of regulatory capitalism and biopolitics to show how clear, predictable governance frameworks can cultivate public trust and encourage radical breakthroughs and innovation. Legal disputes, such as *R v Medicines Control Agency ex parte Pharma Nord Ltd* and *Merck Sharp & Dohme v Licensing Authority*, highlight how definitional ambiguities and extended exclusivity periods have slowed market access, supporting the argument that the procedural inefficiencies are at fault rather than regulation itself. Proposals such as risk-based regulation, adaptive licensing, and global harmonisation are identified as ways to streamline approval processes without compromising safety. Ultimately, regulation acts as a catalyst not a constraint for pharmaceutical progress.

### **Introduction**

The pharmaceutical industry has long expressed concerns that excessive drug regulation and slow approval procedures hinder drug innovation<sup>362</sup>. Nevertheless, regulatory frameworks are not merely constraints, they are essential mechanisms that safeguard public health, uphold market integrity, and

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<sup>362</sup> Health Committee, *The Influence of the Pharmaceutical Industry* (HC) 2004-05, 4<sup>th</sup> Report, Vol 1

foster public trust<sup>363</sup>. Arguments such as Braithwaite's<sup>364</sup> concept of Regulatory Capitalism illustrates how governance structures can promote innovation through predictable and transparent regulations. Similarly, Rose's<sup>365</sup> analysis of biopolitics highlights how managing health risks can actually stimulate biotechnological progress.

While some scholars argue that excessive drug regulation can burden innovators with significant costs and delays, deterring innovators and investors<sup>366</sup>, this essay will argue that drug regulation is not inherently an obstacle to innovation, it is a necessary framework that requires optimisation, not reduction. In addition, this essay will critically analyse the interplay between regulation and the pharmaceutical market dynamics that shape innovation<sup>367</sup>, exploring how misaligned incentives and procedural inefficiencies create barriers, undermining both safety and innovation<sup>368</sup>, whilst also examining how legal disputes over data exclusivity impact generic competition<sup>369</sup>. Finally, it proposes a reformed regulatory model grounded in risk-based strategies and nodal governance<sup>370</sup> to accelerate approval procedures while maintaining high safety standards<sup>371</sup>. These reforms will create an environment where innovation and regulation are harmonious, ensuring that public health and pharmaceutical progress remain complementary objectives.

### **Regulation: Enabler or Obstacle?**

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<sup>363</sup> John Abraham, 'The pharmaceutical industry as a political player' [2002] 360(11) The Lancet (British Edition) pp 1498

<sup>364</sup> John Braithwaite, 'Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism' [2005] 1(5) Regulatory Institutions Network pp 25-29

<sup>365</sup> Nikolas Rose, 'The Politics of Life Itself' [2001] 18(6) Theory, Culture & Society pp 3, 7

<sup>366</sup> R (on the application of Merck Sharp and Dohme Ltd) v Licensing Authority [2005] EWHC 710 (Admin)

<sup>367</sup> Julia Black, 'Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Pjjoost-Regulatory' World' [2001] 54(1) Current Legal Problems pp 139

<sup>368</sup> *ibid* 2 pp 1501

<sup>369</sup> *ibid* 5

<sup>370</sup> Scott Burris and others, 'Nodal Governance' [2005] 01(30) Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy pp 37

<sup>371</sup> David Levi-faur, 'The Welfare State: A Regulatory Perspective' [2014] 92(3) Public Administration pp 601

Regulation is often portrayed as either the catalyst for life-saving innovation or the barrier that suppresses progress. However, in reality, its role is far more nuanced. A well-designed regulatory system provides the foundation for public safety, scientific advancement, and market credibility. Regulation in the pharmaceutical industry consists of a crucial dual role. A well-implemented regulatory framework establishes the trust and credibility essential for market acceptance of new drugs. Over time, regulatory bodies have adapted to align with rapid biomedical advances, increasingly acting as facilitators of innovation rather than its adversaries<sup>372</sup>.

Proposals such as Early Access Programmes exemplify how modern approval processes can introduce innovative treatments and accelerate the entry of new drugs into the market without compromising safety<sup>373</sup>. Furthermore, stringent regulations often push companies to pursue more radical innovations, as well as shift resources towards groundbreaking innovations as the pharmaceutical industry and companies strive to meet high standards<sup>374</sup>. This dynamic allows for pioneering breakthroughs rather than incremental improvement, driving progress in addressing unmet medical needs.

Similarly, the concept of value-based pricing illustrates how regulatory frameworks can align economic incentives with life changing innovation, ensuring that resources are directed towards developing treatments with the greatest social impact<sup>375</sup>. Regulatory frameworks have historically been effective in balancing public safety with fostering competition<sup>376</sup>, as evidenced by the introduction of measures that protect smaller innovators and prioritise patient outcomes<sup>377</sup>.

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<sup>372</sup> Peter Honig and Lei Zhang, 'Regulation and Innovation: Role of Regulatory Science in Facilitating Pharmaceutical Innovation' [2019] 105(4) *Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics* pp 780

<sup>373</sup> Anna Bastone and others, 'How to shorten the market entry innovation in a highly regulated market the case of Early access programs in the pharmaceutical industry' [2023] 19(4) *International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal* pp 1571

<sup>374</sup> D Bardey and others, 'Retail price regulation and innovation: Reference pricing in the pharmaceutical industry' [2010] 29(2) *Journal of Health Economics* pp 304

<sup>375</sup> Rena M Conti and others, 'Regulating Drug Prices while Increasing Innovation' [2021] 385(21) *The New England Journal of Medicine* pp 1921

<sup>376</sup> *ibid* 11 pp 779

<sup>377</sup> *ibid* 12 pp 1574

While industry frustrations about lengthy delays in approval processes and rising costs are valid, they often arise from outdated bureaucratic procedures rather than from the existence of regulation itself. Scholars such as Bastne<sup>378</sup> and Epstein<sup>379</sup> emphasise that targeted reforms, such as risk-based assessments and adaptive licencing<sup>380</sup>, can address delays and inefficiencies in the drug approval process, which are often criticised by pharmaceutical companies for hindering timely market entry, whilst still maintaining rigorous safety standards. This nuanced approach to regulation, when optimised, does not stifle innovation, but rather functions as a mechanism to ensure that new drugs meet high standards, protecting both public health and the integrity of the pharmaceutical market. Establishing clear pathways for compliance and incentivising radical innovation, regulation can serve as a cornerstone of pharmaceutical advancements.

### **Are We Regulating Poorly- Or Just Wrongly?**

The notion that excessive regulation stifles innovation is a weak argument if it fails to consider the inefficiencies within the regulatory system itself. Miller<sup>381</sup> emphasises the importance of consultative oversight, suggesting that regulators should guide pharmaceutical firms toward quality improvement rather than impose rigid sanctions. Miller's approach maintains public trust whilst minimising inefficiencies, addressing the key industry complaint about regulatory delays.

Similarly, Japan's reliance on non-binding 'soft regulations' provides a cautionary tale. Although intended to be flexible, frequent changes and vague guidelines have created confusion and inefficiency

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<sup>378</sup> *ibid* 12 pp 1576

<sup>379</sup> R A Epstein, 'The Pharmaceutical Industry at Risk: How Excessive Government Regulation Stifles Innovation' [2007] 82(2) *Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics* pp 132

<sup>380</sup> Adaptive licensing is a prospective process for authorizing and developing medicines that allows for early market access in a restricted patient population, followed by iterative evidence gathering and expansion of the authorisation to broader groups as more data is collected over the drug's lifecycle.

<sup>381</sup> Edward Alan Miller and Vincent Mor, 'Balancing Regulatory Controls and Incentives: Toward Smarter and More Transparent Oversight in Long-Term Care' [2008] 33(2) *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* pp 253

due to frequent revisions and inconsistent standards<sup>382</sup>. These inefficiencies highlight that it is the structure and implementation of regulations, rather than their existence, that results in the creation of barriers to innovation. Moreover, these non-binding rules often exert quasi-binding influence via informal sanctions, such as funding restrictions, ultimately undermining both innovation and public confidence<sup>383</sup>.

Additionally, Deshmukh<sup>384</sup> argues that the way pharmaceutical innovation is measured contributes to misplaced criticism. An overemphasis on Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval numbers in the US, fails to capture broader societal benefits such as therapeutic value and health outcomes. A redefined regulatory success metric would shift the focus from speed to impact, more successfully aligning with public interest and industry goals. This perspective challenges the notion that regulation inherently stifles innovation, emphasising the need to redefine success in pharmaceutical development.

Likewise, Shaw and Whitney<sup>385</sup> highlight the complementary role of self-regulation in improving efficiency and transparency within the pharmaceutical industry. The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA) Code of Practice demonstrates how industry led ethical standards can evolve quickly to fill gaps in formal legislation, particularly in areas such as marketing and compliance. This collaborative approach between regulators and the industry itself, ensures that innovation is not only supported but also aligned with ethical practices and public safety.

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<sup>382</sup> Shimon Tashiro, 'Unintended Consequences of “Soft” Regulations: The Social Control of Human Biomedical Research in Japan' [2010] 19(1) International Journal of Japanese Sociology pp 11

<sup>383</sup> *ibid* 20 pp 4

<sup>384</sup> Anjali D Deshmukh, 'Redefining Innovation for Pharmaceutical Regulation' [2024] 104(2) Boston University Law Review pp 583

<sup>385</sup> Brendan Shaw and Paige Whitney, 'Ethics and compliance in global pharmaceutical industry marketing and promotion: The role of the IFPMA and self-regulation' [2016] 18(1-4) Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law pp 199

Furthermore, systematic inefficiencies within regulatory bodies play a significant role in the delays that are often blamed on excessive regulation. For example, outdated processes and fragmented global frameworks can prolong approval timelines unnecessarily. Miller emphasises that more forward and transparent regulation can mitigate these inefficiencies, fostering an environment conducive to innovation<sup>386</sup>. Reforms such as adaptive licensing and value-based pricing, as Deshmukh<sup>387</sup> and Shaw<sup>388</sup> observe, have the potential to accelerate processes whilst maintaining high safety standards.

### **Regulatory Capture and Its Consequences**

A significant impediment to innovation lies not in regulation per se, but in regulatory capture, when oversight bodies become influenced by the very industries they regulate<sup>389</sup>. Miller characterises regulatory capture as a misalignment of incentives, where regulatory decisions favour corporate interests over public welfare<sup>390</sup>. The “revolving door” phenomenon<sup>391</sup> exemplifies how close relationships between regulators and firms can compromise impartiality<sup>392</sup>. Instead of creating a fair and balanced system, regulatory capture enables established pharmaceutical companies to consolidate their market power at the expense of smaller innovators and public health.

The case of *R v Medicines Control Agency Ex Parte Pharma Nord Ltd*<sup>393</sup> underscores the limitations of regulatory frameworks, particularly concerning definitional ambiguities and procedural inefficiencies. The case concerned the classification of Melatonin under Directive 65/65/EEC, with the Medicines Control Agency designating it as a medical product requiring pre-market authorisation. The primary purpose of pharmaceutical regulation is to ensure the safety of the drug and efficacy validation before

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<sup>386</sup> *ibid* 19

<sup>387</sup> *ibid* 22 pp 591

<sup>388</sup> *ibid* 23 pp 204

<sup>389</sup> *ibid* 2 pp 1498

<sup>390</sup> *ibid* 19 pp 252

<sup>391</sup> David Oliver, 'The revolving door to the NHS lobby' [2019] 365(04) British Medical Journal pp 1

<sup>392</sup> *ibid* 23 pp 202

<sup>393</sup> *R. v Medicines Control Agency, Ex parte Pharma Nord (U.K.) Ltd* [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 109

public distribution. However, this case exposed significant inefficiencies in the regulatory processes such as criticisms surrounding the pace of approval procedures and legal uncertainties within the system. For example, the extended legal proceedings surrounding the definition of a medical product created unnecessary delays<sup>394</sup>.

Regulatory capture also negatively affects competition within the market. Large pharmaceutical companies can leverage their influence to shape regulations that create barriers for generic manufacturers or emerging firms. For instance, the *Marck Sharp & Dohme*<sup>395</sup> case illustrates how extended data exclusivity periods delay the introduction of affordable generics, limiting competition and keeping drug prices high. This strategic manipulation of the regulatory framework does not stifle innovation in the traditional sense but redirects its benefits towards maintaining monopolies rather than promoting equitable access or groundbreaking research<sup>396</sup>. Regulatory capture creates an uneven playing field that disproportionately harms smaller firms and patients.

Moreover, regulatory capture erodes public trust in oversight mechanisms. The reliance on agencies like the FDA on industry funding, through mechanisms such as the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, raises concerns about the objectivity of regulatory decisions<sup>397</sup>. A similar concern exists for the MHRA (Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency) in the UK. The public trust and confidence in the effectiveness of new drugs diminishes when the public believes that regulators are closely aligned with corporate interests, discouraging the acceptance of new treatments and, paradoxically, stifling innovation.

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<sup>394</sup> *ibid*

<sup>395</sup> *ibid* 5

<sup>396</sup> *ibid* 22 pp 579

<sup>397</sup> *ibid* 22 pp 587

To counter regulatory capture, systematic reform is essential. For example, increasing the independence of regulatory bodies through public funding can mitigate conflicts of interest and restore balance to decision making<sup>398</sup>. In addition, implementing more transparency and ethical self-regulation as well as stricter conflict-of-interest policies into the pharmaceutical industry, would hold companies accountable whilst complementing a more excessive drug regulation control<sup>399</sup>. The reform would not only protect the public, restore independence and trust, but would also ensure a level playing field for all innovators.

### **Harmonising Innovation with Regulation**

The idea that regulation and innovation are inherently incompatible reflects a limited understanding of modern regulatory science. However, when correctly designed and strictly implemented, regulation can serve as a catalyst for innovation rather than a barrier. Risk-based regulation focuses resources on high-risk areas, whilst at the same time efficiently approving pathways for lower-risk products, ensuring an efficient process without compromising safety<sup>400</sup>. For example, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) utilises a risk-based approach when it conducts inspections of manufacturing facilities, prioritizing those with higher likelihood of non-compliance, thereby allowing faster and more efficient regulatory oversight for companies with established safety. This targeted approach illustrates how regulatory systems can accommodate safety, pharmaceutical industry concerns and the everchanging nature of biomedical innovation<sup>401</sup>.

Adaptive licensing is another promising model. By allowing conditional early approval while collecting real-world data post-launch, regulators can fast-track access to transformative treatments<sup>402</sup>. This model has been particularly impactful in the development of treatments for rare diseases, where patient populations are small, and traditional clinical trial designs may be impractical. For example, the FDA's

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<sup>398</sup> *ibid* 19 pp 266

<sup>399</sup> *ibid* 23 pp 203, 204

<sup>400</sup> *ibid* 19 pp 275

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid* 11 pp 779

<sup>402</sup> *ibid* 12 pp 1564



‘Breakthrough Therapy Designation’ has successfully expedited the approval of therapies like Kymriah, the first CAR-T cell therapy, which addresses unmet needs in certain cancers. This demonstrates that consistent and well organised regulatory frameworks can accelerate access to groundbreaking treatments without sacrificing the rigorous regulations necessary to protect public health<sup>403</sup>.

In addition, collaboration between public institutions, regulators, and private companies fosters knowledge spillovers and enhances research and development efficiency<sup>404</sup>, further achieving a balance between rigid regulation and innovation. Similarly to Shaw and Whitney, Francer<sup>405</sup> also emphasises the role of self-regulation in complementing formal regulatory systems, particularly in addressing emerging challenges like marketing transparency<sup>406</sup> and data integrity<sup>407</sup>. Ethical codes, such as the IFPMA Code of Practice, enable companies to self-regulate more efficiently, thereby reducing the pressure on regulators while ensuring that corporate conduct aligns with public health objectives. This approach reduces conflict between stakeholders and cultivates an environment where innovation can flourish within a well-regulated framework.

Global regulatory harmonisation further exemplifies the synergy between innovation and oversight. Hoing and Zhang point to initiatives like the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), which aligns regulatory standards across regions, simplifying approval processes for multinational companies. For example, the harmonisation of clinical trial data submission requirements across the United States, Europe or Japan has reduced

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<sup>403</sup> *ibid* 22 pp 591

<sup>404</sup> Luigi Aldieri and Others, 'The future of pharmaceuticals industry within the triad: The role of knowledge spillovers in innovation process' (2020) 122(9) *Futures: The Journal of Policy, Planning and Futures Studies* pp 2.

<sup>405</sup> Jeffrey Francer and Others, 'Ethical Pharmaceutical Promotion and Communications Worldwide: Codes and Regulations' [2014] 9(1) *Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine* pp 15

<sup>406</sup> Halid Kayhan, 'Ensuring Trust in Pharmaceutical Supply Chains by Data Protection by Design Approach to Blockchains' [2022] 5(1) *Blockchain in Healthcare Today* pp 14,15

<sup>407</sup> *ibid* 23 pp 201, 202

duplication of efforts, allowing companies to focus resources on research and development<sup>408</sup>. This not only lowers costs but also ensures equitable global access to cutting-edge treatments.

On a fundamental level, balancing regulation and innovation requires a change in basic assumptions of how success is measured in pharmaceutical drug development. By prioritising outcomes that address public health challenges, such as improving survival rates for rare diseases or reducing treatment disparities, regulatory systems can accelerate the development of groundbreaking treatments that deliver meaningful benefits. The introduction of value-based pricing, where the cost of a drug is linked to its healing benefits, exemplifies how aligning regulatory goals with public health priorities can drive both innovation and access.

### **Human Impact: Societal and Psychological Consequences**

Whilst much of the discourse surrounding pharmaceutical regulation centres on economic and industrial concerns, the human cost of slow approval processes and excessive regulation cannot be overlooked. Delays in accessing critical medications and treatments, particularly for individuals with life-threatening conditions, have profound psychological and emotional implications. These delays can exacerbate feelings of anxiety, fear, and helplessness, as well as negatively impacting a person's overall well-being and quality of life.

Delayed access to medicines and societal consequences that ensue, can also contribute to a sense of injustice and erode public trust in both pharmaceutical companies and regulatory bodies. As Nussbaum<sup>409</sup> argues, the experience of injustice in healthcare, whether it be through delayed treatment, discrimination, or inequity, can lead to long-term psychological harm, which manifests as feelings of a

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<sup>408</sup> *ibid* 11

<sup>409</sup> Martha Nussbaum, 'Frontiers of justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership' (2006) Harvard University Press

loss of faith in societal structures that are meant to protect. When patients witness the slow pace of regulatory approvals for drugs that could improve or even save their lives, they may experience a profound sense of disenchantment with the system, leading to a lack of confidence in public health institutions.

### **Proposed Reforms**

The psychological and social toll of regulatory delays underscores the urgent need for reform in the pharmaceutical approval process. To address these legitimate concerns, reforms must focus on optimising regulatory frameworks that balance public safety with innovation<sup>410</sup>. This essay argues that a risk-based regulation approach is the optimal reform proposal. Risk-based regulation allocates resources by focusing on high-risk areas while accelerating approval processes for lower risk products. The risk-based EMA approach would prioritise inspections based on risk records, reducing delays, and maintaining high levels of safety.

Likewise, the Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety (IMMDS) Review<sup>411</sup>, emphasised in relation to pelvic mesh implants, the severe repercussions of inadequate regulatory care and the necessity for proactive reform. The recommendations included establishing a risk-based classification system similar to that used in Europe. In addition, the recommendation for a centralised database would enable long term monitoring and enhance the ability to track negative outcomes<sup>412</sup>. Furthermore, the IMMDS report supported reforms that promoted transparency, such as the compulsory disclosure of financial ties between manufacturers and healthcare providers including pharmaceutical companies. It would amplify public trust and guarantee accountability within the regulatory framework. This essay

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<sup>410</sup> *ibid* 43 pp 7

<sup>411</sup> Sonia Macleod, 'The Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review: Regulatory Reform and Remedies' (2023) 5 Law, Tech & Hum 5 pp 9

<sup>412</sup> *ibid* 47 pp 15

argues that it is essential to address inefficiencies within the systems, instead of abolishing them, to preserve and maintain safety while encouraging innovation.

In addition to the risk-based approach, adaptive licensing should also be implemented in England and Wales. Gradual approval for high-potential therapies- especially for rare or urgent conditions- allows the pharmaceutical drugs to reach the market sooner while gathering post-market safety data. Examples that were provided earlier in this essay, like the FDA'S Breakthrough Therapy Designation for Kymriah treatments for cancer or the pelvic mesh implant case, demonstrates that adaptive licensing can address new medical needs without sacrificing public health safety<sup>413</sup>. Moreover, by establishing a long-term safety data collection, the reform would maintain public trust and stimulate innovation.

In the same way, global regulatory harmonisation is an urgent complimentary reform<sup>414</sup>. Aligning international standards through ICH initiatives reduces redundancy, speeds up approvals, and facilitates broader access, lowering costs for multinational companies and accelerating patient access to innovative treatments. The reform also embraced technologies such as blockchain to improve transparency and efficiency, particularly when tracking regulatory compliance and ensuring data integrity<sup>415</sup>.

Finally, the proposed reforms should aim to eliminate or reduce regulatory capture. Ensuring independence through increased public funding and strong conflict-of-interest rules would restore balance to regulatory decision-making and improve trust in institutions. Additionally, it would reduce reliance on industry funding, such as that provided through the FDA's Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), therefore mitigating the biases that may appear within the pharmaceutical industry as a whole<sup>416</sup>. Promoting increased cooperation among regulators, public research institutions and private companies has the potential to improve knowledge transfers, ensuring that innovation within the

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<sup>413</sup> *ibid* 31

<sup>414</sup> *ibid* 44 pp 2,3, 6

<sup>415</sup> *ibid* 42 pp 2

<sup>416</sup> *ibid* 2 pp 1498

pharmaceutical world is fair and significant<sup>417</sup>. This essay has argued that collectively, these proposed changes addresses inefficiencies whilst preserving the protective function of regulation, encouraging drug innovation and public safety.

## **Conclusions**

While the pharmaceutical industry frequently raises concerns about excessive regulation and delayed approvals, the real issue stems from inefficient implementation rather than the existence of regulation itself. Historical cases and present research demonstrate the necessity of strong oversight through regulations. The Thalidomide tragedy serves as a souvenir of what happens when speed is prioritised over drug and public safety, while legal disputes such as *Pharma Nord Ltd* reveal the costs of procedural inefficiencies. This essay has argued that optimizing, rather than minimizing, regulation is the key to fostering innovation. Reforms such as risk- based regulation, global harmonisation and adaptive licensing can accelerate access to new treatments without compromising safety. Furthermore, addressing regulatory capture by increasing transparency, public funding and collaborative governance models may restore public trust and ensure a level playing field.

Ultimately, regulation and innovation need not be mutually exclusive. When harmonised, they serve the dual objectives of safeguarding public health and advancing pharmaceutical progress- ensuring that society is better equipped to meet emerging medical challenges with timely, effective, and safe solutions.

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<sup>417</sup> *ibid* 50